December 2025 should be a milestone for China's two-wheeled electric vehicle industry with the official implementation of the "new national standard". However, as an industry leader, Yadi unexpectedly "overturned" during this critical compliance window.
"Edamame", a product that Yardi had high hopes for seizing the initial market of the new national standard, was extremely crude in design - no storage space, the seats were too short to carry people, and it was even ridiculed as a "shared bike for a new standard", triggering overwhelming complaints on social media. Angry consumers scolded "Yadea's new cars cannot bring children" on the hot search, questioning its use of the new national standards to reduce equipment that is "anti-human". Under the storm of public opinion, Yadi had to issue a series of statements, and finally apologized urgently and removed the relevant models from the shelves.
This is not only a product mistake, but also reflects the confusion of this industry giant, which earns 1.6 billion yuan annually, in the face of policy upgrades and cost pressures. When "compliance" becomes a fig leaf for "reducing allocations", the scale effect and "price for volume" model that Yadi has long relied on are facing an unprecedented crisis of trust.
The whole story of the "Edamame" rollover
On December 1, the first day when the new national standard was officially implemented, Yadi's "Edamame" single-person commuter version was launched on the market. But in the eyes of consumers, this is more like a "semi-finished product".
According to feedback from many car buyers and actual photos of actual cars, this model has obvious shortcomings in practicality. The standard seat space of traditional electric vehicles is completely blocked or eliminated. This means that users cannot store basic on-car items such as raincoats and chargers. Some car owners said helplessly that when riding this car, they have to carry a bag with them to hold the charger.
The vehicle's seat cushions are extremely short and the rear design does not allow for the installation of a compliant child seat or pillion seat. This cuts off the "picking up and dropping off children" scene that Chinese families most need. "The first child can't sit still, and the second child can't be picked up" has become the source of anger among parents. In order to achieve extreme weight reduction, the seat is made of thin foam material, which has extremely poor shock absorption effect. Users jokingly call it "the configuration of a shared bicycle, the price of an electric vehicle."
This "can't do anything except move" design quickly detonated social media. On Douyin and Xiaohongshu, complaints about "Maodou" frequently received tens of thousands of likes, and the number of complaints about Yadi's new national standard model on the Black Cat complaint platform also soared in just a few days.
Faced with the turbulent public opinion, Yadi's initial public relations strategy was to "pass the blame." On the evening of December 4, Yadi issued a statement, suggesting that the doubts posted online were a "misreading" of the standard terms.
However, the official was quickly slapped in the face. The China Bicycle Association and the Consumer Goods Industry Department of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology have successively spoken out, clearly stating that the core of the new national standard is to improve safety (such as fire protection, anti-tampering, and a vehicle weight limit of 55kg), and it has never prohibited the design of comfortable seats or reasonable passenger structures. Official data shows that more than 600 models of more than 100 companies across the country have passed CCC certification, and more than 70% of them are designed with rear hangers.
The official tone made Yadi's defense seem weak. On December 5, Yadi had to issue a second statement, admitting that there were "ill-considered aspects" in the model design, and explained that the "Modou" is only a single version, and a parent-child version will be launched in the future. But by this time, the product's reputation had collapsed.
Industry insiders pointed out that the design logic of "Edamame" is actually very simple and crude: in order to meet the new national standard's rigid target of "the vehicle contains no more than 55kg battery" without increasing costs. In electric vehicle manufacturing, lead-acid batteries are low-cost but heavy, and lithium-ion batteries are lightweight but costly. In order to maintain the mainstream price range of around 3,000 yuan, Yadi still chose heavy lead-acid batteries. This results in the car body having to be extremely "slimmed down". Although using lightweight aluminum alloy frames or magnesium alloy components can solve the weight problem, it will significantly increase the cost. By directly cutting off the seat bucket, shortening the seat cushion, using lightweight foam materials, and removing all unnecessary plastic parts, the standard can be quickly reached with almost no R&D investment.
In addition, there is a kind of "after-installation logic" that dealers are familiar with hidden here. That is, the manufacturer provides a "simplified version" when leaving the factory to comply with national standards. After consumers get the license plate, they can spend money in stores to install accessories such as seat buckets and long seat cushions. However, Yadi did a great job in "simplified configuration" this time, and even the modified space and interfaces became extremely embarrassing, which directly led to turbulent public opinion among consumers.
For a leading company with a net profit of 1.6 billion in half a year, this attempt to pass on compliance costs and modification risks to consumers is undoubtedly a form of arrogance.
The hidden worries behind the 1.6 billion profit
The "Edamame" incident is just an outbreak of the long-term accumulation of problems in Yadi. Underneath the glossy financial statements, this giant is facing the structural dilemma of being "big but not strong".
Judging from the financial report data, Yadi seems to have bottomed out. In the first half of 2025, Yadi's revenue was 19.186 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 33.1%; net profit was 1.649 billion yuan, a surge of 59.5%; sales volume reached 8.7935 million units.
Looking back on 2024, Yadi's revenue fell by 18.8% year-on-year, and net profit plummeted by 51.8%. The rebound in 2025 will largely benefit from the stimulation of the “old-for-new” subsidy policy launched by the country and various regions. Looking at the lengthening cycle, from 2020 to 2023, Yadi's revenue growth has gradually slowed down from 61.76% to 11.92%. As the market share exceeds 420 million vehicles, the dividends of relying solely on scale effects and low-price strategies are fading.
The concern is inventory. The financial report shows that as of the end of 2024, Yadi's inventory amount was 1.279 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 33.91%; the average inventory turnover days increased to 17.03 days. In the first half of this year, although the inventory situation has eased, it still increased by 1.57% year-on-year. At the time of switching to the new national standard, how to deal with the huge inventory of old standard cars while promoting new standard cars is a huge test for Yadi.
The most profound lesson from the "Edamame" incident also exposed Yadi's shortcomings in core technologies. When the new national standards required performance to be guaranteed under weight limits, Yadi's first reaction was to "reduce configurations" rather than "technological breakthroughs." In contrast, "new forces" such as competitors Nine Company and Maverick Electric have already found a balance between compliance and experience through the application of lightweight materials, body structure optimization and intelligent design.
Data doesn't lie. In the high-end market above 7,000 yuan, Yadi’s market share is only 4.1%, while Nine and Mavericks’ market shares are as high as 51.7% and 43.8% respectively.
This is not unrelated to Yadi’s long-term resource allocation of “emphasis on marketing and light on R&D”. In 2024, Yadi's R&D expense rate is only about 4%, which is lower than No.9 Company's 5.8%. In terms of hard-core technology reserves such as intelligence and lightweighting, although Yadi has launched sub-brands such as GN Power and VFLY, it has never been able to get rid of the label of "assembly factory". When industry competition shifted from "fighting on price" to "fighting on experience and technology," Yadi's old method failed.
Yadi has more than 4,000 distributors and more than 40,000 sales points across the country. This was its moat that defeated its opponents in the past. However, during the transformation period, this huge dealer network may also become a burden.
The huge dealer network is accustomed to the traditional "selling logic" and "modification gameplay". "Edamame", a semi-finished product with room for after-installation, may have been a favorite of dealers in the past as a "profit" (to earn modification fees). However, in today's era of stricter supervision and consumer awakening, this kind of gray area operation will only accelerate the overdraft of brand credit.
In addition, during the implementation of this round of new national standards, many dealers have fallen into a wait-and-see mode or even closed stores due to the backlog of old car inventories and insufficient new car product capabilities. The vacillation on the channel side is a more dangerous signal for Yadi than public opinion.