A hacking case that occurred within a U.S. federal government contractor is becoming a negative example of information security and personnel review. Recently, 34-year-old twin brothers Sohaib Akhter and Muneeb Akhter were found guilty by a federal jury or pleaded guilty in advance for maliciously deleting federal government databases and conducting related hacking activities after being fired.
According to information released by the U.S. Department of Justice, a jury recently found Sohaib Akhter guilty of conspiracy to commit computer fraud and password reselling, while his brother Muneeb had previously admitted participating in related acts through a plea agreement. The incident occurred after the pair were fired from their jobs by federal government contractor Opexus, which provides services to more than 45 government agencies and hosts sensitive information including Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)-related data and federal investigative files.
The case shows that Opexus notified the pair of their firings via video conference in February last year after the company discovered that they had federal convictions for cybercrimes dating back to 2015, a key background that was not fully recognized during initial hiring. Although the company claimed to have conducted "extensive background checks" on the two men, it apparently failed to dig into their past hacking records, and this omission paved the way for subsequent serious internal attacks.
Within minutes of being given the pink slip, the brothers began targeting corporate and government data. The investigation revealed that in just a few hours, Muneeb deleted approximately 96 databases containing FOIA request data and documents related to federal investigations. At the same time, he also locked other user accounts, preventing normal access to the system.
Even more embarrassing is that Opexus only cut off Sohaib's system access in time during the termination process, but "forgot" to do the same with Muneeb's account. Within six minutes of being notified of his termination, Muneeb had begun blocking other users and deleting databases, before stealing an additional 1,805 documents from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the federal tax information of more than 450 people.
When investigators reconstructed the incident, they found that the "technical level" of the two brothers was not as sophisticated as that of professional hackers. After deleting the database, in order to cover his tracks, Muneeb actually asked an AI chatbot how to clear the system logs in an attempt to erase traces of the operation. Although the case file did not disclose the specific communication tools between the two parties, law enforcement agencies eventually obtained text records of their conversations, which became one of the important evidences.
In fact, this is not the first time the Akhter brothers have been involved in a federal cybercrime case. In a previous case as early as 2015, the two admitted to hacking into multiple websites, stealing credit card information and trying to sell personal data on the dark web. At the time, Sohaib was also accused of conspiring with his brother and others to steal the personal information of colleagues and secretly installing hardware devices to monitor government systems over time while he was serving at the U.S. State Department.
Opexus admitted after the incident that although the company conducted background checks during hiring, it was "apparently not thorough enough" to identify the brothers' past federal cybercrime records. This mistake, coupled with the failure to fully revoke all account permissions when fired, directly led to the large-scale deletion and theft of sensitive government data within hours.
In terms of judicial proceedings, Muneeb signed the plea agreement before his brother, but recently he began to apply to the court to withdraw his plea in handwritten letters while in prison. In the letter, he claimed that his defense lawyer was "ineffective" and expressed his hope to appear in court to defend himself. The subsequent direction of the case still awaits further judgment by the court.
The incident highlights that any lapses in personnel review and account management in critical systems involving government data, investigative files and citizen privacy can quickly turn into serious cybersecurity incidents. For government agencies that rely on contractors and third-party services, how to establish stricter and more systematic security mechanisms in recruitment, background checks, authority management, and resignation processes is becoming an unavoidable practical issue.