Abstract:
According to a Reuters report on October 23, two senior Iranian security officials revealed that Iran has formulated a detailed attack plan against undersea communication cables in the Persian Gulf. If the United States and Israel launch military operations against Iran again, Tehran may target these critical infrastructures that carry international Internet communications and try to prevent damaged cables from being repaired in time to prolong communications outages.
This threat means that if the war in the Middle East escalates again, the conflict may further expand from military bases, oil facilities and shipping channels to digital infrastructure. Submarine optical cables are an important foundation for the operation of the global Internet and are responsible for most international data transmission tasks. Cloud computing, cross-border financial transactions, e-commerce, enterprise communications, and artificial intelligence services all rely on these lines to maintain stable data connections.
Two Iranian security officials spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity. They did not disclose the specific location, method or timing of the attack, but one of them said that if Iran was attacked, Tehran would try to prevent damaged submarine cables from being repaired to prolong the interruption of Internet and other communication services. The official also warned that if the United States and Israel launch another attack, Iran's retaliatory actions will no longer be restricted by the previous so-called "red lines."
Adora Jawani, deputy head of political affairs of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, had previously issued a similar warning. He said seven major internet cables on the bottom of the Strait of Hormuz could be targeted if infrastructure inside Iran were attacked. The Strait of Hormuz is located between Iran and Oman. It is an important waterway connecting the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is not only related to global energy transportation, but also carries important communication lines between Gulf countries and the international Internet.
However, analysts point out that attacks on submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz may not necessarily have the same impact on the global Internet. Alan Mauldin, research director of TeleGeography, a telecommunications research organization, said that although submarine cables bear about 99% of the world's international Internet communication traffic, less than 1% of the international bandwidth passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, if the damage is limited to the strait, the impact is more likely to be concentrated in the Gulf rather than causing widespread disruption of the global Internet.
Even so, if multiple cables are damaged at the same time, regional communications could still be severely affected. Internet service providers may need to divert traffic to other submarine lines or land networks, and some connections may experience congestion, increased latency or even temporary interruptions. Financial transactions, cloud services, e-commerce platforms, and internal corporate systems may also be affected, depending on the number of damaged lines, network redundancy capabilities, and the efficiency of traffic rerouting.
Repairing submarine cables is no easy task either. The maintenance ship needs to go to the damaged sea area to locate the fault, and then salvage the submarine optical cable to the sea surface for connection. Typically, such work requires specialized ships, equipment and professionals; if the repair site is located in a military conflict zone, security risks, insurance costs and related permitting procedures may further delay the repair progress.
Relevant Iranian officials raised the possibility of blocking maintenance in the hope of prolonging the impact of communication interruptions rather than just causing a short-term failure. However, it is still not possible to independently verify whether Iran can carry out the actions it claims to have planned and whether it has the ability to prevent repairs in the long term. Relevant threats also do not mean that the attack has occurred.
The reason why submarine cables have become potential targets is also related to the Gulf countries' vigorous development of the digital economy in recent years. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are investing heavily in building data centers, artificial intelligence computing facilities and cloud service platforms, hoping to reduce their dependence on oil revenue and develop themselves into regional digital economic centers. These facilities require stable, low-latency international communications connections and are therefore highly dependent on submarine cables and other communications infrastructure.
If undersea communications are severely disrupted, the impact may not be limited to ordinary Internet users. Large data centers need to continuously exchange data with servers, cloud platforms and customer systems in other regions; financial institutions need reliable cross-border communication channels; artificial intelligence services also need to connect computing resources and data sources in different regions. Damage to submarine cables may force relevant companies to reroute data transmission, increase network operating costs, and affect the availability of some services.
Iran’s recent threats also reflect a possible change in the scope of targets in military conflicts in the Middle East. In addition to undersea communications cables, Iranian officials have also mentioned oil facilities, data centers and artificial intelligence infrastructure. Reuters previously reported that Iran is treating these facilities as important targets in potential conflicts and is trying to warn the United States and its regional partners not to underestimate the possible economic consequences of expanded military operations.
However, if Iran attacks the communication facilities of Gulf countries, it may also harm its own interests. Undersea cables provide communications capabilities throughout the region, and Iran's own businesses, residents and public services also rely on stable Internet connections. Qatar had previously warned that the consequences of cutting off relevant cables would first affect countries and people in the Gulf region, and called on all parties to avoid attacking this critical infrastructure.
For the global Internet, risks that deserve more attention lie in other key sea areas. Analysts pointed out that the submarine cable network near the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects many regions in Europe, Asia and the Middle East and undertakes important international data transmission tasks. If the conflict expands to these waters, or if multiple important lines are damaged at the same time, the impact may far exceed the consequences of a partial cable break in the Strait of Hormuz.
In recent years, submarine cables in the Red Sea have been damaged many times, and some incidents have affected network connections in the Middle East and South Asia. As the lines in question connect key communications nodes between Europe and Asia, any sustained disruption could force operators to divert traffic to alternative lines and increase pressure on cross-regional communications. However, the cause of damage to submarine cables needs to be investigated on a case-by-case basis, and all accidents cannot be attributed to deliberate sabotage.
Facing potential risks, Gulf countries and international technology companies are expanding investment in digital infrastructure and exploring more land communication lines to reduce reliance on a few undersea passages. Adding alternative lines and network redundancy can maintain basic communications if some cables are damaged, but building these facilities takes time and a lot of money and cannot completely eliminate the risks posed by regional conflicts.
In general, Iran is said to have formulated a plan to attack undersea communication cables in the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that conflicts in the Middle East may further threaten the critical infrastructure on which the global digital economy relies. However, the current public information mainly comes from the statements of anonymous Iranian security officials, and the specific action plan and implementation capabilities cannot be independently confirmed. Even if an attack occurs, its impact will depend on the extent of the damaged lines, the carrying capacity of the replacement network and whether repairs can be carried out in a timely manner. For Gulf countries, how to ensure the continuous operation of undersea communications, data centers and cross-border networks against the backdrop of rising military risks is becoming a real challenge facing digital infrastructure security.
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